Into the Fray: How a Funders Coalition Restored Momentum for Early Learning in Minnesota by Dave Hage
Into the Fray: 
How a Funders Coalition Restored Momentum 
for Early Learning in Minnesota




Foundation for Child Development commissions case studies that offer a
first-hand account of ground- breaking policy development and practice.
They document the processes that translate ideas into concrete policies and
practices, with attention to the political forces and critical relationships of
trust that are required for genuine implementation.
FCD’s case study series seeks to document efforts of a larger movement in
states, school districts, schools, and in education and advocacy organizations
across the United States to create a well-aligned and high-quality primary
education for all our nation’s children. We believe that site-specific learning
should be broadly shared to deepen the implementation of PreK-3rd
approaches in the United States.
295 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor




This case study was funded by The McKnight Foundation.
Into the Fray: How a Funders Coalition Restored Momentum for Early Learning in Minnesota 1
Introduction
In the fall of 2008, a coalition of Minnesota 
foundations commissioned a local research 
organization to assess the state’s ability to undertake
a major improvement in school readiness and early
learning services for disadvantaged children.
The findings were discouraging.
Richard Chase, working at the research arm of St. Paul’s
Amherst H. Wilder Foundation, concluded that 
Minnesota lacked a political champion for early learning
in the governor’s office or any other executive agency.
He observed that government authority over early
childhood services was fragmented among three
cabinet departments—Human Services, Health, and
Education—leaving no agency with overall authority
or vision. And, he said, advocates in the nonprofit
sphere, while passionate and knowledgeable, lacked
a common set of priorities and a cohesive strategy 
to advance institutional and political change.
“Stakeholders have expressed several early childhood
goals—more money for programs, more quality in
programs, more access to high-quality experiences,
and more school readiness to close the achievement
gap,’’ Chase wrote. “The goals are interrelated, but
emphasize different strategies and lead to some 
confusion by legislators and other decision-makers
about purpose and focus.”
“To make early childhood a priority,’’ he added,
“stakeholders must be assertive to compete with
other interest groups at the legislature and in local
communities in order to get a bigger piece of the pie.’’
And yet just three years later, Minnesota would 
win three highly competitive federal grants to fund
important pilot projects in early education. The three
grants, totaling nearly $90 million over five years,
would fund an ambitious cycle of early learning 
experiments, bringing high-quality education and
family services to thousands of PreKindergarten
children, while modeling rigorous evaluation and
funding mechanisms for wider use (See Box). 
While $90 million is only a fraction of the sum 
that would be necessary to extend high-quality 
education and care to all of Minnesota’s low-income
PreKindergarteners, it was enough to launch 
three ambitious, sustained experiments with 
national implications.
The largest of the three federal grants—a four-year,
$45 million Race to the Top Early Learning Challenge
grant—would allow the state to offer childcare 
scholarships to hundreds of low-income families, 
develop a statewide quality rating system for
PreKindergarten providers, increase training and 
education for the childcare workforce, and build 
a comprehensive system to assess the school 
readiness of the state’s PreKindergarteners. 
A second grant—$15 million from the U.S. Department
of Education’s Investing in Innovation (i3) program—
would fund scholarships for more than 1,000 low-
income families in three communities to attend 
programs modeled on the Chicago Child-Parent Centers.
The third grant—$28 million through the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Promise Neighborhoods
program—would fund a set of “wrap-around’’ services
in a troubled neighborhood of North Minneapolis to
help approximately 600 low-income families prepare
their children for grade school and set them on a 
trajectory for college. 
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This abrupt turnabout in Minnesota’s prospects 
reflected a number of fortuitous events, including
the election of a new, more activist governor and a
“coming-of-age” for local advocates who had spent
years building the case for state and corporate 
support of quality services for low-income children.
Central to the achievement, however, was a coalition
of Minnesota philanthropic leaders who sensed a
vacuum in state leadership and stepped in to fill it.
Over the four years between 2007 and 2011, these
leaders joined forces to provide research, seed
money, staff, ambitious goals, expertise in child 
development, and tactical energy that gave early
childhood services a new coherence in the state 
and a new momentum at the state capitol.
This case study tells their story.
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The state of affairs that Richard Chase described for
Minnesota in 2008 was not uncommon across the
country. In many states, authority over early childhood
programs was scattered across health, education, and
social service agencies—reflecting the ambivalence of
American society about whether the PreKindergarten
years are a time of intellectual preparation, play and 
socialization, or simple babysitting. These fissures had
widened during the 1970s and 1980s, with the emergence
of “family-values’’ partisans who fought several efforts
to expand publicly funded child and family services.
Though the facts were against them—both the emerging
science on child development and the demographic 
realities of a changing society—many argued that
child-rearing was solely the domain of the family, 
and they used the argument effectively to intimidate
elected officials who sought greater public support of
early childhood programs.
Yet in Minnesota, a state long considered a leader 
in child and family policy, Chase’s conclusions were 
startling. For more than two decades, Minnesota had
spent heavily on public schools, public health, and
family social services. It traditionally made full use of
federal programs such as Head Start and Medicaid,
and supplemented them with innovative state programs
such as Early Childhood Family Education, an ambitious
program to teach parenting skills to young mothers
and fathers. For years, Minnesota had enjoyed a low
child poverty rate, a high rate of child health insurance,
and one of the best high school graduation rates in 
the nation.
Minnesota also had a long tradition of enlightened
corporate leadership on family policy. As early as 1985,
an executive named James Renier at Honeywell Inc.
had championed the cause of early childhood education;
with Democratic Mayor Donald Fraser of Minneapolis,
Renier founded a group called Success By Six to 
support low-income families with young children. In
1999, a group of executives from major Twin Cities
corporations, troubled by Minnesota’s stagnation 
in economic development and education, formed a
coalition called the Itasca Project to re-instill the
state’s lost sense of leadership and human-capital 
investment. Among five key initiatives, including 
public transit and higher education, they named early
childhood education as a core priority. 
In addition, the state had a community of pioneering
and energetic advocates for early childhood education,
including a bipartisan Early Childhood Caucus in the
state legislature and Ready 4 K, a small but sophisticated
advocacy group founded by former Mayor Fraser and
led by a respected former legislator, Todd Otis.
Decade of Setbacks
Despite Minnesota’s reputation as a state dominated
by Democrats, this history of investing in children 
reflected a long tradition of bipartisanship, including
leadership from progressive Republicans such as
Governor Elmer Andersen, a pioneer in public school
finance, and Congressman Al Quie, a steady advocate
of education funding at the federal level. This tradition
culminated in 1990 with the election of Governor Arne
Carlson. Though a tough-minded fiscal conservative,
Carlson had himself grown up in poverty in New York
City, and in adulthood became a champion of education
and opportunity for disadvantaged children. On taking
office as governor, Carlson created a new cabinet
agency, the Department of Children, Families, 
and Learning, to fuse research and policy on child 
development and public education. He supported
funding for the state’s Child Care Assistance Program,
also known as “Basic Sliding Fee.’’ And when the 
federal mandate known as welfare-to-work arrived 
in 1996, he embraced a model developed by his
Democratic predecessor, Rudy Perpich, which
uniquely among the states promised to lift families
out of poverty as it moved parents into the labor 
market—and spent heavily on quality childcare for
families trying to leave public assistance.
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But the state had suffered crippling setbacks entering a
new century. The recession of 2001-2002 created a
deficit of more than $2 billion in the state’s biennial
budget—one of the largest deficits, in percentage
terms, facing any state. The 2002 governor’s race went
to Republican Tim Pawlenty, a brilliant and ambitious
young legislator who had taken a no-new-taxes pledge
and wedded himself to a social conservative wing of
the Republican Party. Although Pawlenty accepted
education as the key to Minnesota’s future and gave
several widely admired speeches on the topic of early
childhood development, his 
no-taxes pledge led him to 
deliver a 2003 budget with grave
spending cuts, particularly to the
state’s education and human 
services agencies. 
Pawlenty’s 2003 budget, as approved
by the legislature, cut funding for
the Basic Sliding Fee childcare
subsidy by $86 million, or more
than one-third, and curtailed 
the state’s supplement to federal
funding for Head Start. Pawlenty
also dismantled the Department 
of Children, Families, and 
Learning, returning authority for
PreKindergarten education, early childhood health,
and childcare regulation to three separate state agencies.
In 2005, facing another in a series of seemingly endless
budget deficits, the legislature trimmed funding for
what had been a pioneering statewide PreKindergarten
screening program that tested three-year-olds for
their cognitive and emotional development.
By 2008, overall state funding for early childhood 
programs had fallen by nearly 20 percent in real terms,
even as the number of Minnesota children living in
poverty had nearly doubled. The state’s educational
“achievement gap’’—measured as the difference 
between white children and children of color on
Fourth and Eighth Grade federal reading and math
scores—was the widest in the nation. (Although the gap
between white and Asian children was modest, a surprise
since much of Minnesota’s Asian population consists of Lao
and Hmong war refugees, who have historically struggled
with economic and cultural barriers.)A state report found
that fully half of Minnesota five-year-olds arrived for
Kindergarten testing as unready for school on domains
such as literacy, mathematical thinking, and social 
development—with rates running much higher for 
children from families below 250 percent of the federal
poverty level. (Poor school readiness results were 
especially high among African American and Latino 
children, although state officials found that the racial 
disparities disappeared once they controlled for family 
income.)Head Start was serving 
just 30 percent of eligible children;
Basic Sliding Fee was reaching just
20 percent of eligible families, and
its waiting list had grown to several
thousand families. “Their kids
would be in Kindergarten by the time
they got to the top of the waiting list
for childcare assistance,’’ observed
Barbara Yates, a former assistant
commissioner of education who
was now leading a nonprofit 
advocacy group.
Minnesota’s advocacy community
seemed ill-prepared to deal with such
a wave of political and economic 
setbacks. Some threw in their lot with the public schools,
mounting a campaign to fund Full-Day Kindergarten.
Others began developing a market-based model that
would raise money privately for childcare assistance and
distribute it to families, leaving them to choose providers.
Still others spent year after year at the legislature, 
unapologetically seeking a $1 billion increase in state
spending on early childhood services. “There were a lot
of flowers blooming, but we weren’t getting a bouquet,’’
said Neal Cuthbert, vice president of program at the
Minneapolis-based McKnight Foundation. “It was a
lesson in what happens when you’re not organized,’’
said Denise Mayotte, formerly a program officer at
McKnight and now executive director of the Sheltering
Arms Foundation. “You’re vulnerable to a change in the
political landscape, and you can get crushed.’’
By 2008, overall state
funding for early childhood
programs had fallen by
nearly 20 percent in real
terms, even as the number
of Minnesota children living
in poverty had nearly 
doubled. The state’s 
educational “achievement
gap’’ was the widest in 
the nation.
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In December 2006, the McKnight Foundation in 
Minneapolis announced a new CEO: Kate Wolford, 
a grantmaker with broad experience in family 
development in Latin America and former president 
of Lutheran World Relief in Baltimore, Maryland. At
the time, McKnight was Minnesota’s largest private
foundation, with assets of $2.2 billion and grantmaking
that ranged from the arts to community development
to pollution and the Mississippi River. It also had a 
long tradition of supporting child and family services
and, by one estimate, was Minnesota’s second largest
philanthropic funder of early childhood programs
(after the United Way), with about $5 million in annual
support for a variety of agencies and partners. McKnight
had supported Success by Six, the pioneering school
readiness organization started by James Renier, and
had funded Ready 4 K, the small but influential research
and advocacy organization that had kept the drumbeat
of early childhood education going through the late
1990s and early 2000s.
For more than a decade, McKnight had also been
home to one of the state’s most influential advocates on
early childhood issues, Senior Program Officer Nancy
Latimer. Latimer directed McKnight’s Children &
Families program, where she oversaw nearly $20 
million in annual grants to agencies such as Big
Brother/Big Sisters, Jewish Family Service, and the
YWCA. She was also a prescient thinker about the 
role that childcare would play in the welfare-to-work
revolution of the mid-1990s, and had won national
recognition for her work in child-abuse prevention.
Latimer died of ALS (Lou Gehrig’s Disease) in 2006,
but she had served as a mentor to several younger
grantmakers who now worked at other foundations,
and she had made McKnight a central player in 
Minnesota child and family policy.
After Wolford settled in and took stock of McKnight’s
work, she too found herself dismayed by the setbacks
Minnesota had suffered on early childhood issues. 
She saw that the state had a number of passionate,
knowledgeable advocates, and the topic came up 
regularly when she met with her counterparts at the
state’s other big foundations. And yet she felt Minnesota
was falling behind other states. “I’ve never seen a place
with so many meetings and so little progress,’’ she 
later observed.
At about the same time, a reassessment was under way
at the state’s largest nonprofit funder of early childhood
programs, the Greater United Way of the Twin Cities.
Like many United Way chapters across the country, it
funded dozens of charitable, community, and social
services, and considered itself chiefly an impartial 
fund-raising conduit. By the mid-2000s, however,
United Way leaders had come to feel that their 
traditional fund-raising structure—corporate and
workplace campaigns—was growing outmoded and
losing momentum. The board commissioned a strategy
report by McKinsey & Co., and came away believing 
it needed to focus on a smaller number of priorities
where it could be a community leader and demonstrate
measurable results. Frank Forsberg, a senior vice 
president, thought early childhood investments met
both criteria.
New Leaders
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As a backdrop to these developments, advocates for
early childhood education received unexpected help
from an untraditional quarter, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis. Arthur Rolnick, an economist and
the bank’s research director, had spent years studying
government subsidies to a variety of projects, including
industrial job creation and professional sports stadiums.
He found himself a skeptic in 
essentially every case. But after
conducting a careful study of 
the research literature on early
childhood education, Rolnick 
realized he had found a public 
subsidy he could endorse. In 2003,
he and fellow economist Rob
Grunewald had published a paper in
the Minneapolis Fed’s newspaper,
the Fed Gazette, which drew wide
attention. They documented that
$1 spent on targeted, high-quality
early childhood services yielded a
return to the public of 18 percent
or more—an astonishing result in
economic literature—because the
children who graduated from such programs 
performed better throughout school, were less likely 
to commit crime in adolescence, and enjoyed higher
earnings as adults.
The Rolnick-Grunewald calculation showed early
childhood education to be one of the best public 
investments documented in the economic literature.
Rolnick’s work soon received statewide, then national,
attention and reverberated through Minnesota’s 
corporate and political circles. It gave advocates new
momentum in two ways: It provided an empirical, 
rigorous demonstration of the benefits of investing in
early education, and it added a voice that would prove
influential with business and political leaders.
Rolnick was soon invited to join the board of Ready 
4 K. Then, in 2005, he joined with Duane Benson, a
former state senator and head of the Minnesota Business
Partnership, to found a new group, the Minnesota
Early Learning Foundation, or MELF.  MELF quickly
recruited a group of leading corporate executives to its
board and began raising money to fund a two-pronged
strategy: First, it would develop a
rating tool that parents could use to
choose high-quality childcare
providers (and encourage providers
to improve their own training and
curriculum). Second, it would raise
money to fund private scholarships
that would allow low-income families
to use high-quality childcare.
Meanwhile, change was under way
at a third major Twin Cities social
services funder, The Minneapolis
Foundation. A community 
foundation with $625 million in 
assets as of 2010, The Minneapolis
Foundation had embraced the
cause of Full-Day Kindergarten
(FDK) under president Emmett Carson in the mid-
1990s as a supplement to its funding of other early
childhood services, and had become an influential
voice at the Minnesota Legislature. Carson thought
that, at a time of retrenchment and inertia in state
government, FDK could rally broad support among
educators and parents, and might provide an entry
point to build legislative support for early education.
He asked Karen Kelley-Ariwoola, the foundation’s
vice president of community philanthropy, to take
the lead on the FDK campaign; she organized a 
series of community forums on the topic and began
seeking legislators who might sponsor supportive 
legislation. But the foundation’s support for Full-
Unexpected Help
$1 spent on targeted, 
high-quality early childhood
services yielded a return 
to the public of 18 percent
or more…because the 
children who graduated
from such programs 
performed better throughout
school, were less likely 
to commit crime in 
adolescence, and enjoyed
higher earnings as adults.
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Day Kindergarten puzzled some other members 
of the advocacy community, who feared it might
compete with, rather than complement, the case 
for PreKindergarten education targeted at low-
income families.
The Minneapolis Foundation, nonetheless, brought 
an important asset to the conversation. As a chartered
community foundation, it could legally engage in 
political activity at the legislature, and it employed a
team of lobbyists from the Faegre law firm in Minneapolis.
Then, in early 2007, The Minneapolis Foundation,
too, got a new president: Sandra Vargas. Vargas had
been the top executive officer of Hennepin County, 
the state’s most populous county, and had served on a
number of nonprofit and quasi-governmental boards
around the Twin Cities. She was eager to see The 
Minneapolis Foundation collaborate with its peers.
“Sandy came to me and said, ‘I’d like us to find a way to
partner with other funders interested in early childhood.
Let’s take a step back and look for a way to build some
unity,’’’ Kelley-Ariwoola recalled.
8 Into the Fray: How a Funders Coalition Restored Momentum for Early Learning in Minnesota
A Coalition Takes Shape
In the autumn of 2007, Wolford asked Christine Ganzlin,
who had served with Nancy Latimer and was now 
running McKnight’s Children & Families Program, to
convene a meeting of peer grantmakers to discuss new
steps on early childhood education. Ganzlin consulted
her counterpart Missy Thompson at the United Way,
whose traditional portfolio of family and children’s
grantees gave it broad experience in the field, and 
together they compiled a tentative list. It included
Denise Mayotte, who also had
worked with Latimer at McKnight
and was now running the Sheltering
Arms Foundation, a small but
highly engaged funder of Twin
Cities child and family services;
Karen Kelley-Ariwoola from the
Minneapolis Foundation; Peter
Hutchinson, a public affairs 
consultant who had served 
briefly as Minneapolis schools 
superintendent who was now 
running the Bush Foundation, a large St. Paul 
philanthropy (2010 assets: $760 million); and Kevin
Walker from the Northwest Area Foundation, a large
St. Paul foundation established by the heirs of railroad
magnate James J. Hill (2010 assets: $399 million).
Meanwhile, Sandra Vargas made a call to James 
Hoolihan, president of the Blandin Foundation, a 
family foundation in Grand Rapids, Minnesota, with
just under $400 million in assets. Blandin had just
launched an ambitious early childhood pilot project in
central Minnesota that brought together many of the
elements the Minneapolis funders were studying. It
provided all-day, year-round care and early education
—a rarity in rural counties—for 350 low-income 
children, using funds and staff from both the local
Head Start agency and the Itasca County Area public
schools. It also combined scholarships for low-income
families with a quality rating system for childcare
providers and funding for a formal evaluation of 
children’s outcomes.
In February 2008, after a series of meetings, the group
formally organized itself as the School Readiness 
Funders Coalition. The members included McKnight,
the United Way, Blandin, Sheltering Arms, the 
Minneapolis Foundation, the Grotto Foundation of 
St. Paul, the Women’s Foundation of Minnesota, and 
a private nonprofit called Social
Venture Partners. The members
had two beliefs in common: 
Improving school readiness for
Minnesota’s disadvantaged children
could trigger progress on a broad
range of social challenges, and it was
time for the state’s philanthropic
sector to reach beyond direct funding
of services and take a role in the
state’s policy conversation.
At one of the coalition’s first 
meetings, several participants recall, Hoolihan arrived
with a report on early childhood policy drafted by three
graduate students at the University of Minnesota’s
Humphrey School of Public Affairs. It included a 
full-page diagram of the interlocking providers and 
institutions that comprised Minnesota’s early childhood
care and education landscape. Everyone agreed 
Minnesota’s system was incomprehensible. “We called
it the spaghetti chart,’’ Mayotte said later.
From that series of conversations among the funders,
two key analytical conclusions gradually emerged:
• Poring over financial records compiled by Richard
Chase at Wilder Research, Forsberg and Thompson
estimated that Minnesota was spending about $1.6
billion annually on early childhood care and education.
Of that, by far the largest share consisted of direct
payments by parents to preschools and childcare
“We came up with one 
proposal after another, 
and you would have to say,
‘This isn’t a plan, this is 
a grocery list.’ If the only
message you have is, 
‘We need more money,’
that’s just a nonstarter.’’
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providers, about $1.2 billion annually. State and
federal funding streams added $399 million per 
year—mostly in childcare subsidies to parents, 
Head Start, and the state’s Early Childhood Family
Education program. The philanthropic funders 
combined were providing just $34 million.
The coalition members concluded that if they were
going to achieve broad systemic change in Minnesota’s
early learning system, they must do two things: 
influence political decisions—meaning the governor
and the legislature—on public support for early 
learning, and leverage the private payments of parents
so they would sustain and encourage providers of 
high-quality care and education for their children. 
Said Forsberg, “Our sector was providing two to four
percent of the funding for this system. If your real goal
is to solve the problems of quality and access, it’s not a
problem for philanthropy.’’
• The group arrived at a second, parallel conclusion: 
If they were to influence the public sector debate,
they needed a much more focused and compelling
legislative agenda. About this time, Forsberg had a
meeting with state Senator Geoff Michel, a sympathetic
and influential leader in the GOP caucus. Forsberg
went prepared with pages of documents and charts,
only to have the senator tell him, “Frank, if you have
to turn to Page Two, you’ve already lost most people
over here.’’
Karen Kelley-Ariwoola, who herself had registered 
as a lobbyist by this time, was equally blunt about the
funders’ advocacy posture. “We came up with one 
proposal after another, and you would have to say,
‘This isn’t a plan, this is a grocery list.’ If the only 
message you have is, ‘We need more money,’ that’s 
just a nonstarter.’’ 
Executives and program officers from the foundations
kept meeting through 2008, and it soon became clear
that if they hoped to get the legislature’s attention, to
say nothing of changing the state’s sprawling network
of early learning providers, they would need a high 
degree of unity—and a vigorous political program. 
Yet public policy advocacy was new ground for many of
the funders. Wolford recalls leaving one meeting and
thinking, “I need to check in with legal counsel to make
sure we could craft the partnership in ways that uphold
our legal requirements as a private foundation. We 
didn’t want to back away from the challenge, because 
it was time to step up and move forward.’’
The result was a coalition of funders that would 
prove extraordinary, in Minnesota and nationally, 
in several respects:
• It was unusual, to begin with, that so many large
foundations in one state would make a priority of
early childhood education. Whether because of 
Minnesota’s longstanding belief in the value of 
education generally, or because of local grantmakers’
early attention to research on child development,
McKnight, Blandin, the United Way, the Minneapolis
Foundation, and Sheltering Arms all had made
young children a priority in their grantmaking.
• Second, in an era when many foundations hope to
develop signature initiatives of their own design,
members of the School Readiness Funders Coalition
were willing to set aside their own particular variations
on the early childhood theme and coalesce around a
common philosophy.
• Third, they had deep confidence in empirical research.
This may have been a legacy of Minnesota’s roots in
the progressive tradition and its reliance on experts
and social science, or perhaps it was a nod to the 
influence of local business executives, who lent 
their support to antipoverty efforts but came from 
a numbers-driven culture.
• Finally, they would soon prove unusual in their 
unapologetic political savvy and their willingness to
engage in the world of lobbying, legislative strategizing,
and the cultivation of elected officials. Children’s 
advocates and representatives of several childcare 
associations, who themselves had spent years lobbying
at the legislature, were taken aback at first. “You don’t
usually think of early childhood in the back rooms
making deals,’’ said Ready 4 K’s Todd Otis, a veteran
at the state capitol. “But they took the effort to a 
new level.’’
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First, however, the School Readiness Funders 
Coalition would need a common philosophy of early
childhood education to serve as their rallying point.
Agreeing on this philosophy was no easy task, given
the myriad strategies being pursued across the 
country and even within Minnesota. Although The
Minneapolis Foundation had moved away from
Full-Day Kindergarten, that approach still had 
adherents at the state capitol and support from the
state’s powerful teachers’ union. Head Start, too,
had influential supporters at the capitol and in rural
counties, who felt any new funds
should go to the proven local/
federal model. Others wanted an
even simpler solution—just reverse
the budget cuts to Minnesota’s
Basic Sliding Fee subsidy program
so that more low-income families
could afford reputable childcare
providers.
McKnight, however, had been
gravitating toward an emerging
national model of education 
reform known as PreK-3rd, which
argued that children need 
a seamless set of services starting
well before Kindergarten and
moving well into the elementary
school years. A growing body of
research showed that waiting until Kindergarten 
was too late, because important brain development
happens much earlier in a child’s life, and that ceas-
ing intensive services when children enter grade
school risks losing any early gains to “fadeout.’’
McKnight hired The Bridgespan Group of Boston to
help focus its own strategy on early education policy,
and soon was narrowing its grantmaking strategy
from the broad array of child and family services to
one focused on the PreK-3rd model. The decision was
not without controversy, especially among agencies
that had long received McKnight funding. But in
2009 the foundation realigned its children and family
grantmaking and announced a new initiative with a
tight focus on increasing the share of Twin Cities
children reading at grade level by Third Grade.
McKnight also formed an 
Education and Learning National
Advisory Committee (ELNAC), 
a group of philanthropic and
scholarly experts on child 
development and early learning
practices who would convene 
periodically in Minneapolis to 
advise the foundation.
Other members of the funders’ 
coalition weren’t prepared to em-
brace PreK-3rd at the exclusion of
other early education philosophies,
but they agreed they had more
than enough common ground
with McKnight to move forward
together: a commitment to 
expanding the reach of high-quality
early learning, an integration of PreK education with
public schools, and rigorous measurement systems
to assess the progress of Minnesota’s children.
A Results-Focused Strategy
Finally, to give the 
coalition eyes and ears 
at the state capitol, The
Minneapolis Foundation
agreed to loan its team of
lobbyists from the Faegre
firm, particularly Nancy
Hylden, to the effort. 
That step would prove 
prescient within a year,
when rounding up votes 
for even modest legislation
became pivotal. 
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So that they could start their new effort from a
strong evidence base, they commissioned Richard
Chase’s 2008 “assets review’’ of Minnesota’s early
childhood efforts. Although Chase found himself
discouraged by Minnesota’s shortage of political
leadership, inadequate funding, and fragmented 
advocacy, he also gave the funders encouragement:
“Minnesota needs leadership,’’ he wrote, “and 
many in the political sphere are waiting for the 
philanthropic community to take the lead.’’
To bring greater sophistication to their advocacy 
efforts, at Kelley-Ariwoola’s suggestion the funders
hired the Public Strategies Group, a St. Paul 
consulting firm known for its nonpartisan and 
pragmatic approach to solving public affairs problems.
Public Strategies, too, argued that Minnesota’s 
political leaders were waiting for the foundation
community to exert leadership on early childhood
initiatives. But the firm, which was known for a
“third way’’ philosophy that charted a course between
Democrats and Republicans, took a decidedly 
conservative approach in its report to the coalition.
It said the funders should call for Minnesota to 
put most of its money into measurement and 
accountability tools, rather than simply subsidizing
more access to early education, because public funds
were scarce and decision-makers in state government
were looking for more “bang for the buck.’’
Finally, to give the coalition eyes and ears at the state
capitol, The Minneapolis Foundation agreed to loan
its team of lobbyists from the Faegre firm, particularly
Nancy Hylden, to the effort. That step would prove
prescient within a year, when rounding up votes for
even modest legislation became pivotal. “Nancy
Hylden made all the difference,’’ said state Senator
Terri Bonoff, a new member of the legislature who
quickly became a crucial advocate for the funders’
cause. “She understood how legislators think, 
and she was tireless in finding solutions they could
vote for.’’
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Entering the Political Arena
By early 2010, the funders felt ready to make their
effort public and launch a bid for action at the state
legislature. Though the coalition had no full-time
staff or office space of its own, it was operating on a
budget that year of about $200,000 from member
contributions—enough to contract locally for research,
grantwriting assistance, and public relations advice
—and had the ability to raise additional funds for
special projects. On March 10, the members called 
a press conference at the capitol, with Karen Kelley-
Ariwoola and Frank Forsberg presenting what they
called “An Agenda to Achieve Learning Readiness
by 2020.’’ They had hired a Twin Cities public 
relations firm, Tunheim Partners, and the press 
conference was carefully scripted so the message
would be clear and they would speak with one voice.
The agenda had three pillars: leadership, 
accountability, and funding.
• Leadership:The leadership portion was simple—
The group recommended that the legislature 
create a cabinet-level office of early learning to
oversee Minnesota’s many early childhood 
education, health, and development programs; 
to serve as a clearinghouse for research and policy
development; and to be held accountable for the
state’s progress over time toward school readiness
for all children.
• Accountability:The accountability pillar was
more detailed. The first recommendation was that
Minnesota reinforce the goal, already in state law,
that every five-year-old be ready for school by
2020, establishing milestones to measure whether
the state was making progress. Children should be
screened in five “domains’’—physical development,
the arts, personal and social development, language
and literacy, and mathematical thinking—and 
the state should develop culturally appropriate
tests to measure children’s progress. A second 
recommendation was that Minnesota adopt several
accountability measures, including universal
screening of PreKindergarten children (at the
time, Minnesota was screening just a sample 
of three-year-olds); a quality rating system for
childcare providers and PreKindergartens; and an
annual public report card on whether children’s
school readiness was improving.
• Financing: Pillar three, financing, was more 
nuanced. It specifically urged that the legislature
fund an office of early learning, a statewide quality
rating system for early care providers, a statewide
report card on the school readiness of young 
children, and universal readiness screening of
PreKindergarteners. But it also made a nod to 
the much larger challenge: actually paying for
thousands of Minnesota children to gain access to
high-quality PreKindergarten programs. “Funding
early childhood care and education is complex,’’
they wrote, “and Minnesota faces a funding
dilemma with no easy immediate solutions.’’ In a
single concluding paragraph, they noted estimates
by several experts that simply expanding access 
to high-quality early education so it reached all 
of Minnesota’s low-income preschoolers would 
require additional state outlays of $250 million 
to $290 million annually—enough to more than
double what the state was then contributing.
Building measurement and accountability systems,
and funding additional training for early education
teachers, would require a good deal more. They
did not address the politically fraught question of
how Minnesota might pay for such an expansion.
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The press conference generated only modest news
coverage, but the force and specificity of the manifesto
instantly gained traction with lawmakers and civic
leaders. MELF, with its economic research and 
roster of corporate executives, had “made it cool for
Republicans to talk about early childhood education,’’
recalls state Senator Geoff Michel, a Republican
from the Minneapolis suburb of Edina. The funders’
coalition, he added, brought a
nonpartisan and authoritative
voice that gave it unique stature.
“They hosted retreats and
brought in experts. They made
sure every event was bipartisan—
six Democrats and six Republicans,’’
Michel said. “And they weren’t
just asking for money. They were
asking, ‘How can we as a state 
use resources in a better way for 
a better result?’’’
Within weeks, the coalition and
early childhood advocates scored the first of three
important political victories.
That same spring, a bipartisan group of legislators
had introduced a bill authorizing a task force to
study the creation of a cabinet-level office of early
learning. Minnesota was due to elect a new governor
the following November, and no one could be certain
whether Tim Pawlenty’s successor would make early
childhood a priority in the executive branch. A 
cabinet-level agency would improve the prospects.
The bill had energetic support from a small, bipartisan
group of lawmakers, but they recognized that other
legislators had become hardened after seven years 
of chronic state budget deficits, and that getting a
majority to say “yes’’ to any new state program
would be a challenge. Nancy Hylden suggested a
novel but appealing solution: If the legislature would
authorize the study, the funders would pay for the
staff to write it. “Legislators would be getting good
information on an important topic, and they wouldn’t
have to pay for it. It’s pretty hard to vote against
that,’’ observed Denise Mayotte. “One advantage we
had over any branch of government is that we could
move quickly—we could come up with $25,000
without endless meetings and debate,’’ said Karen
Kelley-Ariwoola.
The bill passed, and that summer
Governor Pawlenty’s Early
Childhood Advisory Council 
appointed a task force on creating
an office of early learning. Three
researchers were commissioned
to write the study: Karen Cadigan,
a recent Ph.D. graduate of the
Humphrey School of Public 
Affairs at the University of 
Minnesota; Steffanie Clothier,
director of family and children’s
policy at the National Conference of State 
Legislatures; and Nara Topp, a consultant to the
Minnesota Department of Human Services. They
set in researching the topic over the summer, studying
both Minnesota’s existing governance structure 
and solutions in other states, and in January 2011
delivered a 67-page report detailing how Minnesota
might establish such an office.
Their timing would prove to be perfect. The 
November 2010 governor’s race went to Mark 
Dayton, a former state cabinet commissioner and
U.S. Senator, and a Democrat with an interest in 
social justice and economic opportunity. When
Dayton’s transition team set up offices, the advocates
and the funders were ready to give his advisers,
ready-made, the case for an office of early learning
and a detailed blueprint for creating it. By early
spring of 2011, Dayton had agreed to set aside a
Lawmakers Take Notice
To underscore his 
commitment to the issue,
the new governor also 
issued “A Seven-Point Plan
for Achieving Excellence,’’
which embodied many 
of the funders’ group 
recommendations.
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deputy commissioner position in the Department 
of Education to supervise early learning policy, and
Karen Cadigan was named to the job. To underscore
his commitment to the issue, the new governor also
issued “A Seven-Point Plan for Achieving Excellence,’’
which embodied many of the funders’ group 
recommendations. He also established a cabinet-level
Early Learning Council, headed jointly by the 
commissioners of education, human services, and
health, to bring agency coordination and institutional
heft to the effort. 
Later that spring, the funders’ coalition and early
childhood advocates scored a second political victory.
While the November 2010 election had transferred the
governor’s office from a Republican to a Democrat,
it had done the opposite in the legislature: A long-
standing Democratic majority had given way to 
Republican majorities in both chambers. Conservative
Republicans in the House of Representatives quickly
moved to cancel state funding for Parent Aware, 
the childcare quality rating system that had been 
developed by MELF and McKnight and was now
supported by the state. The Republican caucus 
included a large bloc of social conservatives with
close ties to the state’s “family-values’’ lobby, which
regarded any state intervention in the childcare system
as government meddling in the family realm. 
The funders’ coalition, however, recognized that 
defunding Parent Aware would be a serious threat 
to progress on early childhood education. Parent
Aware was more than just a rating tool. Its four-star
rating system gave providers a powerful incentive to
adopt quality curriculum and hire well-trained staff.
It aspired to steer hundreds of millions of dollars
that already were in the childcare system—parents’
payments for childcare—toward high-quality
providers rather than casual or kin care. And it gave
Minnesota credibility with public and private funders
by assuring that their money would go toward high-
quality programs capable of preparing children for
school. Working quietly in committees, a bipartisan
group of Republican and Democratic moderates
beat back the proposal.
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Meanwhile, a third important development was
emerging inside the Dayton administration. The
new Commissioner of Education, Brenda Casselius,
had invited Barbara Yates, a former assistant 
commissioner and co-executive director of MELF,
to come back on loan to the department and help
with the staff transition. Casselius had learned that
the U.S. Department of Education’s Race to the Top
grant program now had an early childhood component,
and she was considering applying. Casselius, a former
middle school principal and school superintendent,
did not have a strong background in early childhood
issues but proved a ready listener to the early-learning
advocates who had made their way to her office. But
she was also aware that Minnesota had suffered an
embarrassing defeat in a previous Race to the Top
application, under Governor Pawlenty. She sought
Yates’ advice. Yates thought the components 
assembled by MELF, Ready 4 K and the funders’
coalition put Minnesota in competitive position
under the federal guidelines and emphatically said
yes. Governor Dayton shortly gave his assent.
Knowing that the grant application would run to
hundreds of pages and require weeks of intensive 
effort for a department just getting up to speed, 
Casselius and Cadigan turned to the funders’ coalition
for assistance. As it happened, an experienced 
consultant and grantwriter named Laurie Davis had
worked with MELF; Duane Benson agreed to make
her available to get the application started, and 
The Minneapolis Foundation and the United Way
agreed to pay her salary. At the same time, the United
Way, with support from the Otto Bremer Foundation
in St. Paul, built a public website where providers,
scholars, and others across Minnesota could 
contribute ideas and data for the application.
The funders’ coalition would prove crucial to the
application in two other ways. The rules of Race to
the Top emphasized not just access to early education,
but rigorous evaluation of program quality and 
children’s outcomes. Parent Aware, the quality rating
system that had just been saved in the legislature,
would be the crucial element. Many researchers still
consider it an open question whether quality rating
systems accurately measure quality in childcare 
settings, or improve the quality of care and instruction;
but the presence of such a tool fulfilled a crucial 
requirement in the federal request for proposals.
Then in July, just as the grantwriting team was 
getting up to speed, a budget standoff between 
Governor Dayton and the legislature’s Republican
majority threw the state into gridlock, leading to a
three-week shutdown of all government offices.
With the grant deadline just weeks away, all work on
the application by agency staff at Education, Human
Services, and Health officially came to a halt. Facing
a crisis, the funders’ coalition stepped forward again.
The United Way agreed to continue collecting data
and suggestions on the Race to the Top website. Laurie
Davis, technically under contract to the United 
Way and The Minneapolis Foundation, continued
assembling the application. The government shutdown
ended in late July and on October 11, the 695-page
application went into the mail to Washington.
By coincidence, but not entirely by accident, 
two other Minnesota groups with an interest in 
opportunities for children were simultaneously
preparing their own federal grant applications—
again, with support from the foundation community.
Art Rolnick had by this time retired from the 
Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank and become a
fellow at the University of Minnesota’s Humphrey
School of Public Affairs. He was joined by Arthur
Reynolds, a former University of Illinois researcher
who was well-known as the evaluator of the widely
respected Chicago Child-Parent Centers. Reynolds
and Rolnick had launched a collaboration called the
Three Ideas, Three Grants
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Human Capital Research Collaborative, and together
they came up with the idea of expanding the Child-
Parent Centers model beyond Chicago to other
communities in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.
In addition, they hoped to create pilots for Rolnick’s
model of childcare scholarships to families and the
Parent Aware quality rating system. In the fall of
2011, they applied for a $15 million U.S. Department
of Education grant known as Investing in Innovation,
or i3.
Just a few miles away, in north Minneapolis, a group
of community leaders was considering a federal
grant application of its own. The Northside
Achievement Zone (NAZ) had been created to 
improve education and employment services in a
neighborhood chronically troubled by joblessness,
crime, and poor school achievement. It, too, bore
the fingerprints of the McKnight Foundation. In
2007, McKnight had taken a group of Minneapolis
community leaders, including two officers of NAZ’s
predecessor organization, to New York City for a
site visit to Geoffrey Canada’s Harlem Children’s
Zone. When they returned, they shared their lessons
at a series of community forums, and the NAZ 
was created on the template of Canada’s project. 
Now, four years later, NAZ’s leaders sought to 
build a comparable “cradle-to-college’’ model for
disadvantaged children in north Minneapolis. They
applied for a $28 million Promise Neighborhoods
grant from the U.S. Department of Education.
Although the organizations had separate missions
and were applying for different grants, they had 
several precepts in common:
• They believed in targeting assistance to low-in-
come families rather than funding universal
PreKindergarten.
• Funding would take the form of scholarships 
paid directly to parents rather than payments 
to providers or other institutions. The family
scholarship model became influential in Minnesota
after its adoption by Rolnick and the MELF 
organization, who argued that it increased parents’
engagement in choosing care for their children
and forced providers to compete on the basis of
their credentials. The original MELF pilot project
in St. Paul, for example, gave each family an annual
scholarship of $13,000 for full-time center-based
care and $9,360 for full-time licensed family home
care—but only if they used providers who met the
staffing and curriculum standards set by Parent
Aware. As a political matter, the scholarship model
bridged the gulf between Democrats, who wanted
to put more money into the early childhood system,
and Republicans, who resisted giving more money
to state subsidy programs, Head Start agencies, or
other public institutions.
• The projects would seek integration between 
public schools and PreKindergarten programs; 
they embraced the Parent Aware philosophy 
of measuring childcare quality and steering parents
toward high-quality providers;
• And they required some tool to measure school
readiness and other outcomes for children.
Targeting assistance at low-income children, a 
philosophy rejected by leaders in many other states,
had been a foregone conclusion almost since the 
beginning of the funders’ coalition work, and it 
had several rationales. First, an overriding goal for
the Minnesotans was to close the state’s yawning
achievement gap in the public schools; children
from middle- and upper-income families were
thought to be doing fine in school, and the funders’
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goal was to help disadvantaged children catch up.
Second, the implicit message of the Rolnick-
Grunewald research was that early childhood 
investments earned a spectacular return precisely
because they were targeted at the children who most
needed help. And finally, there was the perceived 
reality that the state’s political leaders—and voters—
would never approve the hundreds of millions of
dollars required for universal PreKindergarten or
childcare services.
Building a continuum from PreK well into elementary
school was also an early precept shared by most of
the funders, borne of the growing body of research
literature and the proven success of the Chicago
Child-Parent Centers. As they considered specific
mechanics of funding and delivering early learning
programs, the funders’ coalition and other players
gravitated toward the model of scholarships coupled
with a quality rating system, because the early
MELF pilot projects already had shown promising
results under rigorous evaluation and were gaining a
strong reputation among the state’s political and
civic leaders.
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In December 2011, these three separate but ambitious
endeavors suddenly bore fruit, all within a few days
of each other.
Rolnick and Reynolds were awarded a five-year i3
grant of $15 million, making them one of just 23 
recipients in a field of more than 600 applicants.
The grant was conditioned on their ability to raise
$1.5 million in matching grants from private sources;
within a few weeks, they raised some $2.7 million
from foundations in Illinois and
New York as well as Minnesota. 
That same week, the Northside
Achievement Zone announced
that it had received a five-year, $28
million Promise Neighborhoods
grant from the U.S Department of
Education, also conditioned on its
ability to raise matching funds.
And a few days later, the U.S. 
Department of Education 
announced that Minnesota would
receive a Race to the Top Early
Learning Challenge grant of $45 million over four
years, to be matched by a state contribution, making
Minnesota one of just nine successful states out of 
36 applicants.
By the middle of 2012, Minnesota was seeing
more—and more promising—activity on early
childhood education than it had seen in years. Using
the Rolnick-Reynolds i3 grant, the St. Paul Public
Schools were preparing to offer services modeled on
the Chicago Child-Parent Centers to more than
1,000 low-income families through six public schools.
A second pilot under the i3 grant was gearing up on
Minnesota’s Iron Range, sponsored by Arrowhead
Head Start and the public schools in Virginia, 
Minnesota. Parents at both sites would receive
scholarships to send their children to rated, high-
quality childcare providers and PreKindergartens,
with public schools helping design curriculum 
and teacher training, and outcomes 
evaluated independently.
In north Minneapolis, NAZ had begun building a
“wrap-around’’ set of services for low-income families
with PreKindergarten children. It would hire 20
full-time mentors, who would help parents find
high-quality PreKindergarten
programs and begin mapping a
college trajectory for their chil-
dren. A set of parenting classes
called Family Academy/ Infant
and Toddler, developed 
in conjunction with education
researchers at the University of
Minnesota, would be offered to
650 families. And 550 children
would receive two-year 
scholarships to attend three-star
or four-star rated childcare 
centers or PreKindergartens, 
with an executive of the Minneapolis Public Schools
advising on curriculum, teacher training, and 
other issues.
Finally, in St. Paul, three state agencies—Education,
Human Services, and Health—were starting work 
on their three-pronged Race to the Top grant, now
supplemented with $60 million in state and federal
funds. They will spend $25 million to expand and
refine Parent Aware, the tiered quality rating system
for PreKindergartens and childcare providers. 
Another $17 million will support workforce training
and degree programs to assure a supply of qualified
teachers at PreKindergartens and childcare providers.
Some $30 million would be made available in access
grants to low-income families, and $21 million
Washington Says Yes
As a result, by the midpoint
of 2012, Minnesota stood
at the threshold of a new
era that could redeem 
its own history as an 
innovator in child and 
family policy while 
modeling promising 
strategies for other states.
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would be set aside for comprehensive assessment of
school readiness in the state’s PreKindergarteners.
The funders’ coalition, meanwhile, had undertaken
an organizational move of its own by merging with 
a second Minnesota philanthropic group, the Early
Childhood Funders Network (ECFN). Roughly a
decade old, ECFN counted about 30 foundations 
in its membership, including some who belonged 
to the funders’ coalition but also many smaller 
philanthropies representing rural parts of the 
state. The ECFN had a history of working closely
with providers of childcare and family education,
particularly on peer education and best practices,
and was active in some 90 small communities across
the state. The merger gave the coalition broader
reach—to rural Minnesota and the provider 
community—while bringing together policy research
with on-the-ground practice expertise. It chose a
new title, the Start Early Funders Coalition for
Children and Minnesota’s Future, and named
Denise Mayotte, Karen Kelley-Ariwoola, and 
Frank Forsberg as co-chairs.
As a result, by the midpoint of 2012, Minnesota
stood at the threshold of a new era that could redeem
its own history as an innovator in child and family
policy while modeling promising strategies for 
other states.
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Significant Challenges Remain
Even though Minnesota stood at the threshold of a new era, it faced important challenges in the effort to 
fundamentally improve early learning opportunities.
•Going to Scale: First among these was to demonstrate that the various projects could replicate the results of models
such as Chicago’s Child-Parent Centers, with measurable and lasting improvements in the social and academic
outcomes of disadvantaged children. One preliminary evaluation of the MELF scholarship pilot in St. Paul’s Frogtown
neighborhood, now serving 348 children, is encouraging. SRI of Menlo Park, California, and Child Trends of 
Washington, D.C., found in their Year 3 Evaluation that the number of families using highly rated PreKindergartens
or childcare providers (rather than unrated neighborhood providers or kin care) had risen 55 percent since the 
program’s outset, and that children were showing measurable improvements in vocabulary, early math, and social
skills by the time they reached Kindergarten age. Yet whether such results can be brought to scale across many
programs and hundreds of families in many communities is widely considered to be an open question. A related
challenge is to build participation in Parent Aware, the state’s nonprofit quality rating system for childcare
providers. Although backed by a prominent group of academic and business leaders, it was operating in only eight
of Minnesota’s 87 counties as of July 2012. Only about 400 providers had volunteered to seek a Parent Aware 
rating, out of some 1,500 childcare centers and more than 10,000 home-based childcare providers in the state.
• Building the PreK-3rd Continuum: A second challenge will be achieving and sustaining a seamless partnership 
between Minnesota’s public school districts and the PreKindergarten and child care providers who aspire to partner
with them. Years of experience in funding early childhood services had shown the staff at McKnight that children’s
early gains can fade out in elementary school without close alignment of training and curriculum, and many in the
funders’ coalition were familiar with the way that PreK providers and public schools sometimes operated 
in parallel but separate universes. Karen Cadigan’s detailed design for a new Office of Early Learning reflects a
mindfulness of the need to align many institutions that have not traditionally worked together. School districts in 
St. Paul and Virginia, Minnesota, have entered the experiment enthusiastically. But broad and sustained institutional
buy-in remains an open question. For example, many PreKindergartens and early care providers have resisted 
programs that grant ratings or accreditation, arguing that they lack the time and money to meet regulatory goals. At
the same time, a long history of tension between Head Start operators and some public school districts—a tension
found in many states—also suggests that the partnerships will take deft and sustained effort.
• Funding Access: Even if the pilot projects can surmount these difficulties, an over-arching question remains: Does
Minnesota have the fiscal capacity and political will to fund high-quality care and education for all of the state’s
133,000 low-income children? The additional cost, $250 to $290 million annually, would represent a doubling of
current state spending on such programs—an ambitious goal under any circumstances. The state’s budget picture
has improved substantially in the 18 months since Governor Mark Dayton took office, but many of the state’s 
lawmakers cut their teeth on a decade of chronic and punishing budget deficits, and the unsteady nature of the
2009-2012 economic recovery has raised lingering worries about state finances. A related question is who would
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control the state legislature going into the budget-writing session of 2013; every member of both chambers would
be up for election in November 2012, but as of 2011, both chambers had large caucuses of free-market and family-
values conservatives who staunchly opposed public spending on early childhood services. In preparation for the
2013 legislative session, the funders’ coalition in the summer of 2012 had moved on to a new phase: Preparing 
a major “ask’’—legislation that would represent a major state funding commitment to expanding access, together
with a communications campaign to build the case with lawmakers and the public. 
• Sustaining Progress: Finally, no one can rule out a political reversal of the kind that took effect in 2002, when
Minnesota elected a Republican governor deeply committed to low taxes and small government. It was just such
an election, coupled with the bruising recession and budget deficits of 2002, that launched Minnesota into a
decade of stagnation, even decline, in addressing child poverty, children’s health, and early childhood services.
The creation of a new, cabinet-level Office of Early Learning creates a potential institutional bulwark against
such a tidal shift—but, like many elected leaders before him, Tim Pawlenty did not hesitate to dismantle the 
institutional innovations of his predecessors.
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The Minnesota experience offers important lessons
for those seeking to advance the cause of early child-
hood education and to improve the opportunities
facing children at risk for poor education outcomes.
• Even a small number of philanthropic organizations,
acting in concert, can alter public thinking and 
win important political victories. Even before they
coalesced as the School Readiness Funders Coalition,
the McKnight Foundation and the United Way
kept early childhood development on the radar of
thought leaders, corporate executives, and elected
officials through a turbulent period, so that there
was support in place when the state’s tides shifted.
Then, acting together, the funders marshaled 
empirical research that corporate and political
leaders could not ignore, developed replication
strategies and organizational models, crafted a
tightly focused agenda that held appeal on both
compassionate and pragmatic grounds, and helped
their political and business allies with messaging
and tactics that overcame opponents. Finally, by
providing staff or targeted grants of modest
amounts, the funders kept the larger Minnesota
public sector moving forward when political events
threw obstacles in the way.
• Modest amounts of money from the nonprofit 
sector can leverage large changes in the public 
sector. By retaining attorney and lobbyist Nancy
Hylden, The Minneapolis Foundation gave the
funders’ coalition instant credibility among state
legislators who were sympathetic but unable to
move legislation. By offering $25,000 to pay for a
study of the creation of an Office of Early Learning,
the foundations not only allowed skeptical 
legislators to vote for a desired piece of legislation,
but also built a persuasive case and developed a
practical blueprint that would change the larger
state bureaucracy in a pivotal way.
• Clear priorities and decisive strategy are essential.
For years, Minnesota’s advocates had made a 
persuasive case—at legislative hearings, to 
newspaper editorial boards, before civic leaders—
that Minnesota needed to invest more in young
children. Yet many of those audiences came away
confused and wondering just where the state should
concentrate effort and funding. By coupling the
PreK-3rd concept and its powerful empirical 
research with the pragmatic approach of quality
ratings and scholarships, the funders formed the
nucleus of a broad and enthusiastic coalition.
• Strategic communications can play an important 
role. In addition to holding a capitol news conference
to announce their agenda, the funders and their
contract communications firm produced a coordinated
series of briefing papers, newspaper op-eds, research
retreats for legislators, and other documents that
described Minnesota’s challenge and the documented
benefits of quality early education. As a result,
there was broad public and political support for 
increased investment, and battles could be fought
chiefly over tactics and timing.
• Social science can change minds when it presents
clear evidence of needs and benefits, documented
by credible researchers. The single best example 
in Minnesota was the 2003 paper by Rolnick and
Grunewald demonstrating high economic returns
to quality early education targeted at disadvantaged
children. By framing the argument as an investment
return, Rolnick and Grunewald expanded 
the constituency to business leaders and fiscal 
conservatives who were sympathetic but 
unconvinced; they also gave traditional advocates
an important new arsenal of evidence. Similarly,
the early evaluations of the St. Paul MELF pilot,
the stature of researchers at the University of 
Minnesota, and the arrival in Minnesota of Arthur
Reynolds and his influential evaluation of the
Lessons Learned
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Child-Parent Centers in Chicago gave the cause
critical mass that skeptics could no longer ignore.
Minnesota still stands some distance from 
fulfilling the promise of school readiness for all its
disadvantaged children. By 2010, more than one-
third of its children lived in households below 
200 percent of the federal poverty line—including
133,000 children under age six who are likely to
need substantial PreKindergarten help to thrive in
school and life. While the $90 million in five-year
federal grants announced in late 2011 will touch
hundreds of families and sponsor important 
experiments, Richard Chase of Wilder Research has
estimated that Minnesota would have to spend up 
to $2.5 billion over five years to fund the ambitious
effort envisioned by the funders’ coalition: scholarships
to make high-quality early education available to all
low-income children, a statewide system to rate the
quality of providers and assess the school readiness of
children, and additional training for early education
teachers and staff.
Nevertheless, the Minnesota experience offers 
encouraging signs—not only for the thousands of
disadvantaged children who will be touched by the
federal grants in their state, but for the broader 
research and advocacy community. It shows that
philanthropic organizations, by deploying sums of
money that are relatively modest compared to public
budgets, can cause change in major institutions and
on a very large political scale. It suggests that, quite
beyond the direct funding of services, foundations
can change the course of public debate by marshaling
empirical evidence, bringing research to bear on
policy development, finding leverage points in the
political establishment, and supplementing the
moral case for early childhood investment with 
convincing pragmatic arguments. Employed
adroitly and decisively, those tactics took a state
where opportunities for disadvantaged children
were growing steadily narrower and opened a 
promising new set of horizons.
Dave Hage is an editor at the Star Tribune in Minneapolis. In 
addition to his work there as a reporter and editorial writer, he has
written for the New York Times, The New Republic, U.S. News
& World Report and The American Prospect. He is the author of
two books, one on the American labor movement and one on welfare
reform. He lives with his wife and children in St. Paul, Minnesota.

295 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor




Connecting Research with Policy for Social Change since 1900
